First, this paper empirically evaluates the incidence of the Japanese place-based job creation program, which is rarely studied in Japan. The program increases employment, especially in the agricultural, retail trade and service sectors that most treated cities promote. Second, this paper theoretically demonstrates that this program's optimal subsidy is to provide cities with improving the establishment of cropland leasehold rights and to empirically verify this result. Third, this paper assesses the rationale of this program and does not observe a strong reduction in sales, workers and establishments in the neighboring cities of the treated city.
Introduction
This paper analyzes the job creation program in Japan. Place-based policies are currently conducted in many countries such as Europe, the U.S. and Asian countries. Governments that hope to help residents in disadvantaged areas base their equity criteria in the face of differences in local labor market outcomes across cities and regions. Most previous studies have emphasized assessing the subsidy's impact on job creation, and most academic research and official government documents evaluate how the policies affect local employment, usually with the goal of computing the number of job created per dollar/yen spent. However, this emphasis is not enough. The placedbased policies are efficiency only under some conditions including imperfect labor mobility, a market failure, missing insurance/credit constraints, public good and so on. Furthermore, if placebased polices positively affect treated cities, but the externality effect on other cities results in a negative impact, the program is not rational. Kline and Moretti (2014a) argue that the job growth resulting from place-based policy induces migration into the treated community and increases living costs, thus, the benefit from a subsidy turns to land owner under the perfect mobility. From this perspective, Busson, Gregory and Kline (2013) analyze the federal urban empowerment zone program. Busson, Gregory and Kline (2013) note that if most agents are inframarginal in their commuting and residential decisions, the deadweight loss will be small, and local workers will reap the benefits of placebased interventions. If agents have nearly identical preferences, the deadweight loss will be substantial, and government expenditures will be capitalized into land rents. They use confidential micro data and find that the empowerment zone program increases employment and wages without triggering corresponding increases in population and local cost of living. This paper evaluates precisely the incidence of the place-based job creation program in Japan including the resident's mobility.
Furthermore, this paper considers the optimal use of this program's subsidy. Kline and Moretti (2013) show that the targeting of less-productive areas implicit in the place-based subsidy is efficient when the hiring cost is excessive using a theoretical model. They say that the subsidy is optimal even when labor is perfectly mobile across cities. Few papers have empirically studied the optimal use of place-based policy and market failure. It is important to consider the optimal 4 use because the budgets of policy programs are always limited. This paper theoretically demonstrates and empirically examines the optimal use of place-based job creation programs in Japan with the market failure that comes from hiring costs 1 .
The place-based job creation programs that this paper analyzes are conducted in rural areas where the number of vacancies per a job seeker is lower than the national average. These areas have an aging population problem and face global competition. Aging owners put less effort into filling vacancies because they might consider closing their establishments. Aging landowners constrain young workers who have no land but have the will to work in agricultural sectors. The transfer of rights for agricultural land (sale/leasing) has been historically regulated. The establishment of leasehold rights is now allowed to promote effective land use, but the establishment of leasehold rights varies by region. This paper demonstrates that the areas with improving the establishment of leasehold rights should have higher subsidies from the place-based job creation programs. In other words, the communities where the leasehold rights are well established can use the subsidy of the place-based job creation program efficiency. Given the aging population, this paper makes a simple model and verifies empirically the results.
Although this program is efficient due to market failure, we need to consider whether the program is a zero-sum game. In other words, this paper assesses the rationale of this program. If consumption demand increases in the treated cities, thus increasing the number of jobs created, but the consumption demand decreases in neighboring cities, thus resulting in a decrease in the number of jobs, the gain in the treated cities is cancelled out by the loss in the neighboring cities, and the total gain at the national level is zero. Bartik (1991) argues that the place-based policy increases the productivity of firms in the treated zones and contributes to economic growth at the national level, not just at the local level. Freedman (2012) estimates the effect of new markets tax credit using regression discontinuity design and shows the spillover effect on neighboring is small. Ham, Swenson, İmrohoroğlu and Song (2011) find the positive impact of state enterprise zones, federal empowerment zones and federal enterprise community programs on local labor markets using the difference in difference estimation and insignificant spilover impact to neighboring 1 Higuchi (2001) , Nakata (2007) and Azetsu and Fukushige (2009) have evidenced high hiring costs in the Japanese labor market.
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census tracts. In contrast, Chirinko and Wilson (2008) shows that the U.S. states' investment tax credit increases investment at the treated states, but the neighboring states' capital price increases (and investments go down). Wilson (2009) shows that R&D tax credit increases the own state's R&D, but the decreases in R&D in other states cancel out this increasing. He demonstrates that the own state's magnitude of the elasticity is the same with that of other states. Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) also show that the reducing the payroll tax weight increases the employment in the own state, but decreases the employment in other states. Roughly speaking, the studies that consider the effect on other states' price show the negative externalities. Freedman (2012) notes that prior evidence on spatial spillovers associated with geographically targeted incentive programs is mixed.
In either case, few empirical studies address this issue about job creation programs. This paper considers the impact on neighboring cities of the treatment group. Determining whether the increase in consumer demand in the treated cities is cancelled out by the loss in neighboring cities makes sense in this place-based job creation program, as this program offers how-to seminars for local establishments to help them attract consumers to their local goods, in many cases using local specialty agricultural products.
Kline and Moretti (2014a) also discuss the related rationale of the agglomeration economy. Moving workers from city b to city a caused by that city a is designated some place based policy will yield an agglomeration gain in city a and a loss in city b. Social welfare can be raised if the gain is greater than the corresponding loss. At a social optimum, the gains and the losses cancel each other out exactly. Kline and Moretti (2014b) show that whether this cancelling out occurs depends on the elasticity of local productivity with respect to density. If this elasticity is constant, the gains of reallocating a worker from one community to another are always cancelled out. They show serious flaws in the agglomeration rationale for spatially progressive subsidies in U.S. manufacturing. This paper's contributions to academic literature include a theoretical and empirical demonstration of optimal use and an examination of the programs' rationale. As the fundamental issue, however, a detailed empirical evaluation of Japanese place-based policy for job creation has rarely been conducted prior to this study. One reason for this research gap is a lack of data. The place-based job creation programs that this paper analyzes have the advantage of being able to 6 provide data, being a financial program and being able to estimate a pure effect. Some policy programs do not publish detailed data. Some policy programs are place-based, but all prefectures are targeted. Some policy programs, e.g., programs conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, seek to develop local areas, not just create jobs. Major place-based policy for job creation is a designated structural reform district, and many studies discuss this policy in Japan. However, a designated structural reform district is exempted regulations and is not financial benefit, such as a tax reduction 2 or subsidy. Since 2016, the government has reformed designated structural reform districts and designed new special zones that reduce taxes. Prior to the effect of these new special zones, the results presented in this manuscript will provide some milestones regarding the efficiency from the place-based policy.
To evaluate the incidence of the place-based job creation program, this paper makes mention of a control group. Neumark and Kolko (2010) carefully discuss how to make a control group in their estimation of California's enterprise zone program. They argue that some previous studies' broad control groups, e.g., estimating the effects of enterprise zones in a number of states compared with areas in states outside the enterprise zones, make no sense. In addition, they argue that matching census tracts with enterprise zones that use propensity score matching does not account for unobservable sources of job growth differences. Similar to Billings (2009) , they designate a narrow buffer just outside the enterprise zone as the control group. However, the placebased job creation program that this paper examines includes seminars on how to attract people to buy the local products from the treatment, making it possible to push neighboring cities' consumer demand far away from neighboring cities' markets. Therefore, this paper does not use Neumark and Kolko's above-described approach. Following Busso and Kline (2007) 3 , Neumark and Kolko (2010) also use those added later to enterprise zones as control groups. Busson, Gregory and Kline (2013) use rejected and future applicants to the empowerment program as a control group. This paper makes a control group like that of Busson, Gregory and Kline (2013) .
The aims of this paper are as follows. First, this paper empirically and precisely evaluates the incidence of place-based job creation programs in Japan. Second, this paper theoretically demonstrates that this subsidy's optimal use is providing cities with improving of the establishment of land leasehold rights, if labor market failure exists. This paper then estimates whether these cities benefit from a larger effect of this program. Third, this paper assesses this program's rationale, i.e., it determines whether the program is a zero-sum game. This paper examines whether the loss of sales, workers and establishments in the cities neighboring the treated cities cancels out the gain in the treated cities.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the place-based job creation programs that this paper evaluates. Next, Section 3 presents the empirical approach for examining the incidence of the programs. Section 3 also explains the data, displays the fundamental evidence using figures, and explains the estimation results. Section 4 presents the theoretical model used to consider this program's efficiency and optimal use and also shows the empirical approach and estimation results. Section 5 analyzes the rationale of the programs.
Section 6 presents the robustness check of the program incidence results from Section 3. Section 7 presents the conclusions and discussion. First, this paper examines the incidence of the place-based job creation program explained in the above section. To evaluate its incidence, this paper uses the difference-indifferences method. Bell, Blundell and Reenen (1999) notes that the treatment and control groups should react similarly against exogenous macro shocks; therefore, some of the previous studies have selected time periods that present similar macro-environments with the periods before and after an event change and compare these time periods with the periods before and after an event change. However, this method obtains the average effect observed in the treatment group but cannot obtain the average population effect. Instead of this method, Busson, Gregory and Kline (2013) solve this issue by selecting a control group. They make regions that were previously rejected but allowed into designated empowerment zones in subsequent rounds their control group.
They demonstrate that, after some basic adjustments, the pretreatment levels and trends in the control group closely mirror those of the treatment group. In this paper, the treatment group 
where is a log of outcomes in city i at time t. This paper uses (1) the number of workers who live in the targeted city (treatment/control group) and (2) the number of workers who work in the targeted city as outcomes. This paper also estimates the effect by sector: (3) the number of workers in the agricultural sector, the wholesale, retail trade and service sector, the manufacturing sector, and the financial sector. This paper predicts that we will observe a significant positive effect in the agricultural sector and the wholesale, retail trade and service sector because many treated cities conduct trial business, such as the creation of local brand goods using regional specialty products or the expansion of business opportunities to sell local specialties in these sectors. These programs also implement job training and seminars for local establishments in these sectors. The effect on manufacturing is unclear because the manufacturing sector is weak in many treated cities. This paper also predicts that we will not observe significant effects in the financial sector because this program does not directly intervene to create jobs in the financial sector. Furthermore, this paper analyzes whether this program induces labor mobility. Therefore, this paper examines the effect on (4) the population, (5) the number of households, (6) the population inflow and (7) the population outflow. Unfortunately, there is no data about wages and housing costs at the city level, especially in small cities where the treatment or control groups are located. However, the impact 10 of housing costs is minimal in these areas due to the current population decreases in Japan. This paper observes sales volume instead of wage in Section 5. is the time dummy that equals zero before the period from 2007 to 2009 and 1 after 2010. is the treatment group dummy, which equals 1 if city i is the treatment group and is otherwise zero. 3 is the estimated effect of the place-based job creation programs. are control variables, such as the lag share of manufacturing in total number of workers, the change in population density over the [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] period and the unemployment rate in the base year (2000).
To examine the factors that cause different program effects, this paper estimates difference-in-difference-in-differences using the following model:
where is a factor dummy variable that equals (1) 1 if the proportion of people over the age of 65 is more than 32% of the total population in 2000 and zero otherwise, (2) 1 if the working age population is less than 58% of the total population in 2000 and zero otherwise, and (3) 1 if the population per square kilometer is more than 176.65 and less than 439.825 and zero otherwise.
Thirty-two percent is almost equivalent to the prediction for the national average aging rate in 2030 6 . A city with a large aging population has less consumer demand. A large aging population also means less labor supply. This paper examines whether the effect of this program is less in cities with a large aging population. The aim of using the working age population rather than the labor force participation rate is to roughly capture the negative effect of too few young residents (e.g., only one class in each grade at school, resulting in less competition, less peer effect, less information about career options from friends, less influence and less opportunities for younger generations to play an important role in the community). This paper also predicts that the programs will affect cities with lower population densities less because lower population density does not benefit from an agglomeration economy. An overly high population density also has its disadvantages; therefore, in this paper, the third quartile of population density (when the population per square kilometer is more than 176.65 and less than 439.825) equals 1. The estimations of the model (1) and (2) There is no information about why cities in the control group did not use the program in earlier years. There are several possible explanations, including the following: the city was rejected; it was not eligible to apply; it was unwilling to apply for the program; or it did not have information about the program. Table 1A shows descriptive statistics of pretreatment sample, and Table 1B provides p-values for the t-test of the null hypothesis that average pretreatment levels and trends of the treatment group and control group are equal. Although Table 1B shows that the levels and trends of the treatment group and control group are similar over the 2000-2005 period, some minor differences arise, e.g., in the manufacturing share level, the unemployment level and trend in population density. This paper excludes these differences through control variables. As for 12 population inflow and outflow, this paper uses data from Basic Resident Registration, for which mayors are responsible. of cities that participate in this program decreases at a cutoff ratio of 0.9 job vacancies per job seeker in 2008; 0.9 is the ratio required to be eligible for this program's subsidies 8 . Table 2 shows the estimation results of 3 , the coefficient of the cross term between time dummy and treatment group dummy, using Model (1). The first row shows the results for the logged number of workers who live in the cities in the treatment or control group. The second row shows the results for the logged number of workers who work in the treatment/control group.
Results
Column (1) is the result without control variables. Column (2) sector by approximately 5%, as shown in Column (1) and Column (2), which is a smaller (but positive) effect than that on the agricultural sector. However, if the model is controlled for the unemployment rate in the base year, the effect is insignificant because the increase in workers in the wholesale, retail trade and service sector is higher in cities with higher unemployment rates in the base year 9 . In contrast, the program does not affect the manufacturing and financial sectors.
The coefficients are insignificant from Column (1) to Column (3). To confirm the concentration of manufacturing sector (and other sectors), this paper considers the distribution of workers in each sector, but there is no significant difference between sectors 10 . The manufacturing and financial sectors do not concentrate in specific cities in the treated (and control) group.
This paper roughly calculates cost using the results above. This paper multiplies the average number of workers in the agricultural sector in 2005 by 11% and multiplies the average number of workers in the wholesale, retail trade and service sector in 2005 by 5%, then aggregating these two numbers. This aggregate is the number of workers increased by the place-based job creation programs. Dividing 2.5 million dollars by this increased number of workers equals approximately 4857 dollars. This amount may be an overestimation of the programs, as cities simultaneously use municipal budgets to promote local job creation and many cities also use subsidies provided by other ministries. In fact, when they apply this program, cities are recommended to design the program in relation to their industry promotion policy and related policies for local regeneration by other ministries. Therefore, they could use their budget for their industry promotion policy, and they could, in most cases, get subsidies from other ministries for related local regeneration policies. Table 3 shows the estimation results with respect to mobility. This paper examines whether migration occurs as a result of increasing jobs in the treatment group. The first and second 9 If this paper regresses the logged number of workers in the wholesale, retail trade and service sector by an unemployment rate in the base year, the coefficient is significantly positive: 0.24 (without control variables) and 0.26 (controlled for a lag share of manufacturing and a trend in population density), although the correlation between them is 0.395. The results are available upon request. 10 The distributions are available upon request.
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rows are the estimation results for population and number of households, respectively. In Column
(1) and Column (2), the results indicate that the program increases the population and number of households in the treatment group. Furthermore, to examine whether these increases are a result of migration, the third and fourth rows indicate the estimation results for population inflow and population outflow, respectively. The results for population inflow are significant, while the results for population outflow are insignificant. The place-based job creation program induces population inflow, moreover, net inflow. Table 4 displays the estimation results using Model (2). Columns (1) through (3) show the results regarding whether cities with an elderly population (older than 65 years old) of more than 32% generate fewer jobs. Column (1) is the result without control variables, Column (2) (1) through Column (3) strongly support the latter factor rather than the former factor. It can be interpreted that establishments prefer to find their workers from thick labor market even if there is unemployment in their located areas with a large aging population.
Columns (4) through (6) display results that use the share of working age population, instead of the aging population. If there are fewer residents of working age, the programs' effect decreases, as shown in the results for workers who live in the targeted cities (first row) and workers 11 There are no lag variables in this estimation.
work in the targeted cities (second row). In contrast to the results about the aging population, the programs' effect on the local area decreases, even if commuting workers are included. This decrease indicates that a small working age population has negative impacts, such as a lack of energy among locals. With regard to workers in the agricultural sector, the small working age population does not matter compared with the large aging population; the large aging population decreases the program's effect. The place-based job creation programs discussed in this manuscript affect the agricultural sector, regardless of the working age population.
Columns (7) through (9) indicate the results for population density. This paper predicts that the program affects cities with lower population densities less than those with higher population densities. However, all of the results are insignificant. Although this paper changes the cutoff point for population density, it does not show significant results. Kazekami (2016) argue that the multiplier effect of job creation (the magnitude of additional job creation when a new job is created) is smaller than that of the U.S. The insignificant results might be related to the treated regions being located mostly rural areas that do not benefit from the agglomeration economy.
Through Column (1) to Column (9), the estimation coefficients of the cross-terms between the time dummy and treatment group indicator are significantly positive.
Furthermore, this paper examines the incidence of this place-based job creation program using a regression discontinuity design. Figure 4a indicates the log number of employment in 2005, the period before the start of the programs, and there is no discontinuity. In contrast, Figure 4b indicates the log number of employment in 2010, and there is discontinuity at the cutoff point. The steady state value of searching for a job is given by the following equation:
where r is the interest rate. The flow utility of unemployment b captures the generosity of the local safety net and the value of leisure. The term r indicates the steady state value of employment as follows:
where w represents the wage, and s represents an exogenous separation probability. Assuming the standard general equilibrium of a fixed workforce that freely moves and obtains everywhere equal flow utility z, the restriction in an interior equilibrium is as follows:
Firms may post vacancies that entail flow cost k. Following Pissarides (1999, 2009 ) and Kline and Moretti (2013) , this study assumes that the firm must pay a fixed hiring cost H before hiring a worker with whom it is matched. Note that k and H are distinguished by the fact that the vacancy costs are already sunk by the time the firm is matched with the worker, while the hiring costs are not. The value of posting an unfilled vacancy is as follows:
The value of of a filled vacancy is as follows:
where p is the productivity of the match, which we assume is city-specific and common to all matches in the city. Aging is the cost of filling vacancy by the owner of a firm.
(1) Aging owners exert less effort because they are considering closing their establishments alongside offering jobs.
(2) In the agricultural sector, aging landowners also decrease the value of a filled vacancy in the total local labor market. If aging landowners stop cultivating crops and do not lease/sell their land or hire young workers, the latent vacancy is not filled. The constraining factors for other agricultural firms could be indirectly interpreted through Equation (5). Aging is city-specific and common to all matches in the city because the municipality operates the support systems that find successors or improve cropland leasing 12 . Aging owners are one of major problems in rural areas in Japan. This study is interested how the diversity of political treatment of the aging owner affects the optimal use of the place-based job creation program's subsidy.
The free entry of firms drives the value of an unfilled vacancy to zero:
In a steady state, there will be no migration, and the local unemployment rate, u ≡ will be determined by the usual function of inflow and outflow rates:
Finally, this study assumes that wages are set via Nash bargaining over the match surplus:
where β is the worker's share of the match surplus.
12 The regulation of leasing is determined by the nation; however, allowances are determined at the municipal level, and improving the establishment of leasing rights varies across cities.
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The equilibrium from (4), (5) and (6) is as follows:
Plunging (3) into (2) produces the following equation:
Plunging (10) into (1) and free mobility is then rewritten as follows:
The following equation comes from (3), (5), (8) and (10):
Equation (12) indicates that aging owners decrease the wage level.
Plunging (9) into (11) using (12) produces the following equation:
From (11) and (12), the following equation is then arranged 13 :
Using (13) and (14), this paper produces the following equation 14 :
Considering efficiency, the total surplus is maximized. The surplus, S, consists of the output of productive matches net of the steady state costs of hiring replacements plus the leisure associated with unemployment minus the flow cost of maintaining unfilled vacancies. This must then be netted out relative to the outside option, which offers workers utility level z.
13 See Appendix 1 for details.
14 See Appendix 1 for details.
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The following equation assumes discount rates of zero to compare steady states without considering the convergent paths between steady states:
The first order condition of this problem is as follows:
This equation governs the efficiency of the job creation process, which determines the local unemployment rate.
is the negative elasticity of the job filling rate. With this convention, (17) can be rewritten as follows:
For this equation to coincide with (14), when agents have discount rates of zero, we use the following equation:
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Rearranging (18), this study writes the optimal hiring cost as follows:
Using (15), this optimal hiring cost is rewritten as follows:
This equation indicates that optimal hiring costs are proportional to the local aging owners' level;
especially cities with a large worker's share of the match surplus have high proportions. Following the finding of the previous studies (Higuchi, 2001; Nakata, 2007; Azetsu and Fukushige, 2009) that the hiring costs are high, this paper considers hiring costs to take the value ̅ > * . Therefore, the subsidies are efficient in this case. The optimal subsidy is as follows:
Aging owners decrease this subsidy. The support systems for finding successors or establishing leasing rights decrease "Aging" (i.e., the owner's effort/cost to fill a vacancy). This means that the cities with establishing sufficient number of leasing rights or systems for finding successors can use the subsidy efficiently. Providing the subsidy to cities that have the support systems to find successors or improve the establishment of leasing rights is the optimal use of this program's subsidy.
Empirical approach and data
In this section, this paper examines whether the programs' effects are greater in the cities with the improved establishment of cropland leasehold rights. This paper divides the sample into the cities with major improvements to the establishment of leasehold rights and the cities with minimal improvements to the establishment of leasehold rights. This paper investigates the aging landowner's problem that constrains young workers and other agricultural firms rather than the support system to find a successor because the place-based job creating programs that this paper examines mainly affect the agricultural sector, as shown in the results in Section 3.3. This paper uses the following a criterion to divide the sample:
L= the area of the land with established leasehold rights / the number of potential entrepreneurs
If L is greater than 7.94, this paper determines that cities are presenting sufficient improvement in the establishment of leasehold rights to newcomers that start working in the agricultural sector; otherwise, the improvement is not sufficient. The value of 7.94 is the mean. 
Estimation results
Column (1) in Table 5 shows the estimation results without controls. Column (2) 
Empirical model and data
Although the program is efficient, is not it a zero-sum game? In this section, this paper considers whether the increase in consumer demand and the employment growth in the treated cities do not take a consumer demand away from neighboring cities. This paper analyzes whether the logged number of workers who live in neighboring cities and the logged number of workers who work in neighboring cities decreases through place-based job creation programs. This paper also conducts the same analysis for sales, the number of employed workers and the number of establishments associated with general retail and food and beverage retail, as the cities primarily use this program in the tourism and agricultural sectors. If tourism were to increase in the treatment group, the sale of souvenirs, food, sweets and drinks could increase. In turn, if local brand goods that used local specialty agricultural products were sold well, the sale of souvenirs, food, and sweets could increase. The term "neighbor" is used if more than 10% of workers who live in a city c commute to any targeted cities in 2005 15 . This paper uses following model:
where is the logged number of workers who live in the targeted cities and the logged number of workers who work in the targeted cities, the log of sales, employed workers, and establishments in the general retail trade sector and in the food and beverage retail trade sector in city i at time t.
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if cities are neighboring cities of the treatment or control group. This paper estimates (1) cities in the treatment group versus neighboring cities of the treatment group, (2) cities in the control group versus neighboring cities of the control group, and (3) neighboring cities of the treatment group versus neighboring cities of the control group. With respect to (1), if the program has a positive effect on the treatment group, it could be possible that we observe negative effect on neighboring cities of the treatment group even though outcomes of the neighboring cities do not change. As for (2), this paper confirms no effect on the neighboring cities of the control group. Then, as for (3), this paper predict a negative effect on neighboring cities of treatment group comparing the neighboring cities of control group if the increase in consumer demand and the employment growth in the treatment group take a consumer demand away from neighboring cities. This paper also estimates the sample, including cities in the treatment group, cities in the control group, neighboring cities of the treatment group and neighboring cities of the control group. Therefore, this paper modifies Model (1) as follows:
where is a treatment group dummy that equals 1 if city i is a treatment group and otherwise equals zero. equals 1 if city i is a neighboring city of the treatment group, and equals 1 if city i is a neighboring city of the control group. Therefore, the control group is the baseline.
Data are obtained from the census of commerce. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry conducts this survey, which covers all wholesale and retail trade stores. This paper also obtains data about the number of workers who live in the targeted cities and the number of workers who work in the targeted cities from the population census, as mentioned in Section 3.2. This paper estimates Equation (1) and Equation (2) using a block bootstrap. A prefecture level is used as a block. Table 6 shows the estimation results for Model (1). Column (1) shows the estimation results of neighboring cities of the treatment group versus cities in the treatment group without controls, and Column (2) shows the estimation results with control variables. The first and second rows show results using population census data. The number of resident workers and commuting workers in neighboring cities of the treatment group does not decrease due to the place-based job 28 creation programs. The third row and below show results using census of commerce. The program decreases the number of workers and establishments in the general retail trade sector in neighboring cities of the treatment group. However, as mentioned in earlier, if the program has a positive effect on the treatment group, we observe negative effect on neighboring cities of the treatment group compared with the treatment group even though outcomes of the neighboring cities do not change. Table A1 (see Appendix) shows the results for this program's effect using census of commerce to establish difference-in-differences between the treatment group and the control group. The program increases the sales and number of establishments associated with general retail trade in the treatment group.
Estimation results
Columns (3) and (4) The effects of the programs on neighboring cities of the treatment group and neighboring cities of the control group do not differ, as displayed in Column (5) and Column (6). Figure 5 indicates the coefficients of the cross term between the time dummy and the neighboring cities' dummy by definitions of neighboring cities. The term "neighbor" is additionally used if more than 15% and 12.5% of workers who live in a city c commute to any targeted cities in 2005. The magnitudes of coefficients decrease with the expansion of the range of neighboring cities, although coefficients are insignificant. Table 7 provides the results for the treatment group, the control group, neighboring cities of the treatment group and neighboring cities of the control group. Columns (1) and (2) are the uncontrolled results and the results controlled by a lag share of manufacturing and a trend in population density. The first row indicates that the cross terms between a treatment group dummy and a time dummy are significant. The programs increase the number of workers who live in the 29 treatment group and who work in the treatment group and the general retail sales in the treatment group compared to those of the control group. However, there is no difference between neighboring cities of the treatment and the control group, neighboring of the control group and the control group in terms of the number of workers, sales and establishments, as shown in the second and third rows by each outcome. As shown in Table 6 and Table 7 , this paper does not clearly observe the program's destruction of neighboring cities' demand.
Robustness check
Finally, as a robustness check, this paper uses the data collected before starting the program to estimate Model (1) Table 8 .
Conclusion and discussion
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This paper has three purposes. First, the empirical evaluations of job creation have rarely been conducted in Japan. In particular, government officials generally focus on how many workers are generated per dollar/yen spent. Therefore, this paper empirically and precisely analyzes the incidence of place-based job creation programs conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and
Wealth. The results show that the program increases workers, especially workers commuting to the cities conducting the programs, and the program induces a net population inflow. Furthermore, the programs remarkably affect the agricultural sector and the wholesale, retail trade and service sector in which most cities conduct trial business or seminars via these programs. However, the program has a lesser effect in cities with large aging populations or small working age populations.
Second, this paper demonstrates the optimal use of this program's subsidy when market failure exists due to high hiring costs. This paper makes the model and examines it empirically.
Few studies empirically investigate this issue, but the detailed data allow empirical demonstration in this paper. As a result, this paper shows that cities that improve established leasehold rights for cropland (in an effort to use aging land owners' land by putting young workers, who have the will to work in the agricultural sector, to work) should have higher subsidies. The empirical results indicate that this program is actually more efficient in those cities.
Third, this paper confirms whether the zero-sum game does occur; in other words, the program increases employment in the treatment group but decreases the labor demand in neighboring cities due to a decrease in consumer demand. Many previous studies overlook the total aggregate effect, especially by empirical demonstration; in addition, government official only calculates the number of workers generated in the treated cities, but considering the total effect is important for policy evaluation. Many cities conduct seminars on how to attract people to local specialty products. Therefore, this paper uses the sales data from census of commerce and the population census. As a result, this paper does not observe a clear decrease in sales or the number of workers in neighboring cities of the treatment group.
One limitation of this study is that the magnitude of positive incidence of this placebased job creation program includes some impacts that come from other subsidies because treatment cities are recommended to design the program in relation to their industry promotion policy and related policies for local regeneration by other ministries. To expand this paper, it must be determined whether the program reduces the number of unemployment benefits in the treated 31 cities. However, this program also induces the participation of potentially unemployment such as female workers (sometimes from farm families).
Appendix 1 (Appendix for the theoretical model in Section 4.1)
From (11) and (12), we produce the following equation:
We then establish the following equation:
We plunge (13) into (14), as follows:
This paper rewrites this equation as follows:
This paper thus produces the following equation: Each entry gives the difference-in-differences estimate (dTC; time dummy×treatment dummy, dNtre; time dummy×neighbor of treatment group dummy, dNcon; time dummy×neighbor of control group dummy) of the program on the outcome presented in each row.
a: Observations for sales in a general retail trade sector are 838, observations for sales in a food and beverage retail trade sector are 895, observations for workers and establishments in both sectors are 900 for column (1) and (2), respectively. 974 974 Table 7 The effect on the neighbor cities-treatment vs control vs neighbor of treatment vs neighbor of control (1) 
